AUTHORITY.
IN GENERAL.If the Secretary establishes the program authorized under section 101, then the Secretary shall establish a program to guarantee troubled assets originated or issued prior to March 14, 2008, including mortgage-backed securities.
GUARANTEES.In establishing any program under this subsection, the Secretary may develop guarantees of troubled assets and the associated premiums for such guarantees. Such guarantees and premiums may be determined by category or class of the troubled assets to be guaranteed.
EXTENT OF GUARANTEE.Upon request of a financial institution, the Secretary may guarantee the timely payment of principal of, and interest on, troubled assets in amounts not to exceed 100 percent of such payments. Such guarantee may be on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Secretary, provided that such terms and conditions are consistent with the purposes of this Act.
REPORTS.Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall report to the appropriate committees of Congress on the program established under subsection (a).
PREMIUMS.
IN GENERAL.The Secretary shall collect premiums from any financial institution participating in the program established under subsection
. Such premiums shall be in an amount that the Secretary determines necessary to meet the purposes of this Act and to provide sufficient reserves pursuant to paragraph (3).
AUTHORITY TO BASE PREMIUMS ON PRODUCT RISK.In establishing any premium under paragraph (1), the Secretary may provide for variations in such rates according to the credit risk associated with the particular troubled asset that is being guaranteed. The Secretary shall publish the methodology for setting the premium for a class of troubled assets together with an explanation of the appropriateness of the class of assets for participation in the program established under this section. The methodology shall ensure that the premium is consistent with paragraph (3).
MINIMUM LEVEL.The premiums referred to in paragraph (1) shall be set by the Secretary at a level necessary to create reserves sufficient to meet anticipated claims, based on an actuarial analysis, and to ensure that taxpayers are fully protected.
ADJUSTMENT TO PURCHASE AUTHORITY. The purchase authority limit in section 115 shall be reduced by an amount equal to the difference between the total of the outstanding guaranteed obligations and the balance in the Troubled Assets Insurance Financing Fund.
TROUBLED ASSETS INSURANCE FINANCING FUND.
DEPOSITS.The Secretary shall deposit fees collected under this section into the Fund established under paragraph (2).
ESTABLISHMENT.There is established a Troubled Assets Insurance Financing Fund that shall consist of the amounts collected pursuant to paragraph (1), and any balance in such fund shall be invested by the Secretary in United States Treasury securities, or kept in cash on hand or on deposit, as necessary.
PAYMENTS FROM FUND.The Secretary shall make payments from amounts deposited in the Fund to fulfill obligations of the guarantees provided to financial institutions under subsection (a).
Wasn't it the business of insuring these risky investments that caused
AIG to go bankrupt?
Isn't it the insurance of these risky investments that threaten to bankupt
a number of other hedge funds?
The government should not be in the business of insuring risky investments.
This creates a moral hazard - it provides an incentive for making risky
investments. The riskier the insured investment, the better, because
it is more likely to result in an insurance payout.
This is a poison pill capable of empyting the treasury.
Because, at some point, the treasury will need to be bailed out
on this misguided insurance scheme. They will cry out that they
must keep their promises. Well, people, not one penny of
taxpayer money should ever be used to bail out this scheme.
The treasury should not make promises it can't keep. The taxpayers
should not have to stand behind this scam.
Please VOTE NO on this bill. The government must NOT go into
the shady business of credit default swaps. Don't let these wolves
get their foot in the door.
This section is utterly moot. Paulson said he'd never even consider doing this.
posted by David Klassen at October 3, 2008